1) I think discussions about whether morality is subjective often get tied up with discussions about the validity of a particular set of beliefs that is supposed to provide a foundation for morality.
To make that concrete -- I think "morality is subjective" often means something like "there is no extra-human, rational authority to which we can appeal to determine the validity of moral judgment". And I think it's common for this to get tied up with discussions of religion -- people who say "morality is subjective" also tend to be people who don't believe in the truth of a particular religion, and vice versa, because for people who believe, religion does provide that kind of extra-human authority.
So it seems like the claim that "morality is subjective" is more often a claim about the existence of that kind of authority, and not so much about the nature of morality itself.
2) I think something very important in the nature of both aesthetics and morality is the character of moral and aesthetic judgments as having an implicit *claim for universality*. You sort of allude to this but not quite explicitly. I think this is in Kant, but it's been so long since I read him I'm not sure. I don't think it's quite true that moral / aesthetic statements *are* universal, so much as that they *claim to be* universal. I don't believe that's just a consequence of the fact that we make these claims in natural language. We could (and often do) make statements in natural language that don't claim universality. It's something distinctive to certain domains of judgment. Somehow it *matters* that in making a moral or aesthetic judgment I'm not just talking about my own personal experience.
Historically we have dealt with this through appeal to external authority. Without those authorities the claim for universality feels groundless, but at the same time we are reluctant to abandon it because our lived experience e.g of morality says otherwise. So we're in this confusing space where we want to make universal claims but we don't know how.
To me what it seems like we're missing is a more well-understood conception of the dynamic by which moral and aesthetic judgments emerge from active social discourse. The best articulation of this I've found is Arendt's public sphere (Habermas also discusses this but I think is too focussed on a narrow understanding of politics).
Mike, thanks for this awesome comment. You make some very helpful and subtle points. I agree that one thing meant by "morality is subjective" is a query for authority -- that's a nice addition. I will look into Arendt and Habermas more. I have seen their views mentioned in various places but never really studied them.
I might ask, if morality is subjective why do we argue about moral issues as if we’re seeking truth rather than just sharing our preferences? When someone says slavery was/is wrong they seem to be making a claim about slavery itself, not just expressing personal distaste.
I think it's correct to suggest that the way morality looks and feels to us puts pressure on the belief that it is subjective. One explanation is that we express moral judgments through natural language which aspires to be objective and represent the way the world truly is.
I’m tempted to answer that the boundaries of my tribe are “x” meaning variable to each tribe. The real answer is that I’ve written a whole book to define this boundary; you can read an introductory sample at https://www.tribeing.org. But I’ll give a simple quote to try to at least give a direction of a much larger answer:
“A Tribe of Knowing and Being Known, where faces are familiar, and names are spoken with care. Here, Love roots itself in shared lives. 150 hearts, not as numbers, but as intertwined pulses.”
Very nice article. A couple of thoughts.
1) I think discussions about whether morality is subjective often get tied up with discussions about the validity of a particular set of beliefs that is supposed to provide a foundation for morality.
To make that concrete -- I think "morality is subjective" often means something like "there is no extra-human, rational authority to which we can appeal to determine the validity of moral judgment". And I think it's common for this to get tied up with discussions of religion -- people who say "morality is subjective" also tend to be people who don't believe in the truth of a particular religion, and vice versa, because for people who believe, religion does provide that kind of extra-human authority.
So it seems like the claim that "morality is subjective" is more often a claim about the existence of that kind of authority, and not so much about the nature of morality itself.
2) I think something very important in the nature of both aesthetics and morality is the character of moral and aesthetic judgments as having an implicit *claim for universality*. You sort of allude to this but not quite explicitly. I think this is in Kant, but it's been so long since I read him I'm not sure. I don't think it's quite true that moral / aesthetic statements *are* universal, so much as that they *claim to be* universal. I don't believe that's just a consequence of the fact that we make these claims in natural language. We could (and often do) make statements in natural language that don't claim universality. It's something distinctive to certain domains of judgment. Somehow it *matters* that in making a moral or aesthetic judgment I'm not just talking about my own personal experience.
Historically we have dealt with this through appeal to external authority. Without those authorities the claim for universality feels groundless, but at the same time we are reluctant to abandon it because our lived experience e.g of morality says otherwise. So we're in this confusing space where we want to make universal claims but we don't know how.
To me what it seems like we're missing is a more well-understood conception of the dynamic by which moral and aesthetic judgments emerge from active social discourse. The best articulation of this I've found is Arendt's public sphere (Habermas also discusses this but I think is too focussed on a narrow understanding of politics).
Mike, thanks for this awesome comment. You make some very helpful and subtle points. I agree that one thing meant by "morality is subjective" is a query for authority -- that's a nice addition. I will look into Arendt and Habermas more. I have seen their views mentioned in various places but never really studied them.
I might ask, if morality is subjective why do we argue about moral issues as if we’re seeking truth rather than just sharing our preferences? When someone says slavery was/is wrong they seem to be making a claim about slavery itself, not just expressing personal distaste.
I think it's correct to suggest that the way morality looks and feels to us puts pressure on the belief that it is subjective. One explanation is that we express moral judgments through natural language which aspires to be objective and represent the way the world truly is.
The Institution of Marriage is not subjective? :)
Morality is subjective relative to my tribe.
What are the boundaries of your tribe?
I’m tempted to answer that the boundaries of my tribe are “x” meaning variable to each tribe. The real answer is that I’ve written a whole book to define this boundary; you can read an introductory sample at https://www.tribeing.org. But I’ll give a simple quote to try to at least give a direction of a much larger answer:
“A Tribe of Knowing and Being Known, where faces are familiar, and names are spoken with care. Here, Love roots itself in shared lives. 150 hearts, not as numbers, but as intertwined pulses.”
Very cool, thanks for sharing your website. It is super interesting.